Antiwar and queer liberation politics

The antiwar and queer liberation movements are natural allies. Yet the focus on “don’t ask don’t tell” threatens to turn the queer liberation movement pro-militarism.
The two perhaps most important specific LGBT-related issues in recent times — gay marriage, and “don’t ask don’t tell” — are both in a sense actually quite reactionary. They amount to promoting marriage, and promoting the military. These cases are instances of the following general scenario. Marginalised populations (women, queer peoople, jewish people, muslim people, black people, indigenous people, etc. etc.) have long been unjustly excluded from respectable institutions in society (voting, marriage, military, universities, parliaments, corporations); respectable institutions usually being conservative or reactionary, attempts to end this exclusion run the risk of promoting conservative or reactionary institutions. The most liberatory position is to say that the exclusion is unjust; but the inclusion only affirms the conservative/reactionary institution. Taking this position pushes the envelope and promotes critical thought and struggle in the movement, but runs the risk of alienating the movement and losing more mainstream elements.
Emma Goldman, that great defender of the rights of queer people, and much else besides, distinguished sharply between marriage and love. Marriage may have been something a little different in her day from what it is today, but she opposed marriage with such vehemence that she proclaimed above it that motto Dante inscribed on the gates of hell: “abandon all hope ye who enter here”.
In fact, at the widely attended rallies against proposition 8, I never heard a word against marriage; rather there tended to be strong — and passionate and genuine — statements of how one should be able to marry the person one loves and wants to spend one’s life with, and how in this regard queer people should be treated no differently from hetero people. This is deeply moving and touching. It is also, however, rhetoric that if they were made in a heterosexual context, would amount to highly conservative “defence of family values”. For myself, I don’t think the State has any place in marriage at all, regulating people’s private lives in that way; and the historical baggage of women’s oppression through marriage makes it a deeply troubling institution. If I want to spend my life with somebody, I hardly think I should need to get some certificate from the State or Church to authorise it. Proposition 8 was to be opposed, in my view, not in defence of the regressive institution of State-sanctioned marriage, but in opposition to discrimination and bigotry. I think the best one can say about it is, “State-sanctioned marriage is an oppressive institution, but if you want it, you should be able to have it!”
Similarly, the military is an oppressive institution, but if you want to join it, you should be able to!
In this sense, the homophobic policy of “don’t ask don’t tell” in the US military is to be opposed, and its end is to be welcomed. But this should not amount to promoting miltiarism, or promoting the horrors of US military actions, or promoting reactionary patriotism. Those queer people who want to sign up for the US military, just like straight people who sign up for the same, should heed the warning of Goldman, that they are, amongst many other concerns,

assum[ing] that our globe is divided into little spots, each one surrounded by an iron gate. Those who have had the fortune of being born on some particular spot, consider themselves better, nobler, grander, more intelligent than the living beings inhabiting any other spot. It is, therefore, the duty of everyone living on that chosen spot to fight, kill, and die in the attempt to impose his superiority upon all the others.
The inhabitants of the other spots reason in like manner, of course, with the result that, from early infancy, the mind of the child is poisoned with bloodcurdling stories about the Germans, the French, the Italians, Russians, etc. When the child has reached manhood, he is thoroughly saturated with the belief that he is chosen by the Lord himself to defend his country against the attack or invasion of any foreigner. It is for that purpose that we are clamoring for a greater army and navy, more battleships and ammunition. It is for that purpose that America has within a short time spent four hundred million dollars.

It is a lot more than four hundred million dollars today.

Critique of a Critique of Conservatism

In the course of events, I came across this article, “What Is Conservatism and What Is Wrong with It?”
I think it is a very good article on the whole, but I have a few comments. These are probably make me sound more negative than I actually feel about the article: to much of it, I very much agree, think it is eloquent, and have nothing to add. I only comment on things that I find exceptionally good or worth taking issue with.
0. One can almost pinpoint the author’s background from the content. Ultra-US-centric notions of “conservative” and “liberal”: a US citizen. Categorical statements, clear insights, idiosyncratic ideology: a scientist academic. Support of the Democratic party and dismisal of the Green party: a US liberal academic. Hyper-rational argumentation, non-critical effusive usage of “entrepreneurship”: in IT or CS. Overlaid and particular Hollywood references, yet a professor in computers: must be in LA! There you have it, a UCLA Information Studies professor!
I am sure one could do the same with me and what I write. Still, this sort of thing is interesting.
1. Probably the most accurate succinct description of the notion of “political correctness” I’ve ever seen: “It is true that movements of conscience have piled demands onto people faster than the culture can absorb them. That is an unfortunate side-effect of social progress. Conservatism, however, twists language to make the inconvenience of conscience sound like a kind of oppression. The campaign against political correctness is thus a search-and-destroy campaign against all vestiges of conscience in society.” There is much more that one can say about this, of course, psychologically, politically, philosophically. I tend to read “politically correct” as “correct and progressive and you don’t like it”.
2. For all its excellent history, and history from outside the US, the author fails to make clear that he is only talking about US conservatism. In Australia, and in many other parts of the world today, “liberal” and “conservative” are synonyms, not opposites. I think all readers should know this.  Nonetheless, the whole discussion is off on an insular footing. I would also say it gets off on a bad analytic footing — I would say that the hisotrical lineage of “liberal”, whatever else it means, always implies support, if only reluctant, for capitalism.
3. The discussion of democracy is extremely good, I like it very much; in particular the way he relates it to everyday interactions. “The rights revolution is hardly perfect. But the main difficulty with it is just that it is not enough. A society is not founded on rights alone. Democracy requires that people learn and practice a range of nontrivial social skills. But then people are not likely to learn or practice those skills so long as they have internalized a conservative psychology of deference. The rights revolution breaks this cycle. For the civil rights movement, for example, learning to read was not simply a means of registering to vote, but was also a means of liberation from the psychology of conservatism. Democratic institutions, as opposed to the inherited mysteries of conservative institutions, are made of the everyday exercise of advanced social skills by people who are liberated in this sense.” This is what all activists — indeed, all citizens — should aim at.
4. For someone who seems to be familiar with Marx, and other left-of-liberal thought, some statements come across as awfully ignorant, e.g.: “One part of democracy, contrary to much socialist teaching, is the democratization of goods and skills, entrepreneurial skills for example, that had formerly been associated with the elite.” One could just about say that the democratization of economic abilities, like producing goods with all the associated skills, or consuming goods, is a *definition* of socialism. And, he seems to know this, even if he presents it with a snarl: “All that Marx offered to people who worked in deadening factory jobs was that they could take over the factory.” Quite strange. The reflexive anti-socialist tendencies of US liberals — particularly liberal academics, who are one modern version of a priesthood (another version is the think tanks etc.) — are quite interesting, have interesting historical/political/psychological roots, and are worth thinking about.
5. The use of “aristocracy”, instead of many others commonly employed in left writing — e.g. “ruling class”, “power elite”, “power”, “corporatocracy”, etc. — is very idiosyncratic. I suppose he is trying to tie it in to historical roots, but his whole point seems to be to modernize arguments against a conservative power elite. It also makes it unclear precisely who he is referring to: owners of capital, managers, politicans, pundits, corporations, corporate managers, ideologues, the rich, the ultra-rich? So this strikes me as strange and anachronistic.
6. The particular detail on various words, and the mechanics of rhetoric and argumentation, are very good. It is a few years old now, but I think this is useful to read. I can only amplify the following: “Logic does include the syllogism, but it also includes a great deal of savoir faire about what constitutes a good argument, a good counterargument, and a good counterargument to that. In particular, the citizen must have a kind of map of the arguments.”
7. The uncritical usage of “entrepreneurialism” as a phrase, apparently wholly positively, is very idiosyncratic in an essay that is surely written from and and to the left. Only in the US could such a thing be written with a straight face. it really sounds bizarre to my ears. But I suppose that is the product of the culture of computer science and information technology, saturated with start-ups and vast amounts of capital and business jargon which, like all capitalist economic ideology, cloaks systems and institutions of exploitation in apparently neutral terms. Like many terms of economic discourse, this word packs together all sorts of notions. Certainly it is associated with creativity and innovation, which are fine. But it is a very specific type of creativity and innovation, namely those which can give immediate profit; I would not say that this is the same as creativity and innovation which is socially useful; sometimes they overlap, sometimes they do not. And there is no denying that “entrepreneurship”, however it is used, connotes and at least partially includes disproportionate wealth, even greed, far more than any egalitarian conception of economic justice could countenance. With the lack of a socialist culture in the US, and the triumph of capitalist ideology cloaked as business jargon, this meme has slipped through the defences of even an ultra-rational ultra-scientific left academic.
8. The hyper-modernism, almost techno-utopianism, of prevailing culture, particularly in the IT sector — and its consequent forgetting of the true material state of the world — comes through in a particularly damaging way here: “While unions and collective bargaining exist in many contexts for good economic reasons, they are an essentially medieval system of negotiations among orders and classes. They presuppose a generally static economy and society. They are irrelevant to knowledge-intensive forms of work. Nor do they provide any kind of foundation for democratic politics.” Sure there is a qualification, but if one considers the working conditions, living conditions, and incomes of most people in the world — even in the US — and the effect that unionization has had and is having to promote justice, this is indefensible. He is slapping in the face the majority of the world, calling their primary means of seeking justice “medieval”; this is unforgiveable.
Moreover, is he completely unfamiliar with the idea of trade unions as a democratic basis for a future society, i.e. syndicalism? Aren’t the “knowledge-intensive” workers he is referring to just a privileged subclass who are not in such dire need of a union? Is this just more reflexive US-academic-anti-Marxism? I tend to think it is just a little too much being caught up in the “dynamic knowledge economy” that one hears in Information Studies departments, but it should be called out. This language is usually the meaningless dot points of corporate monotones, but it does have a corrupting effect, as we see here.
In fact, as he says, and I agree, “Liberal ideology is in disarray”. This essay is partly inherits that disarray. In many ways it helps, probably much more than it hurts. But I think it is worth pointing out that it partially contributes to it, by amplifying part of the problem: its disconnection from anti-capitalist and socialist thought; the author seems to have a very idiosyncratic mix of hostility, ignorance, and clear understanding of it.
I like his style. That may be because I am a mathematician!

Easiest Election Ever

Most Australians must be glad the farce is almost over. The federal election is only a few days away.
And the farce has surely led the country to an historical ebb, an international embarrassment for democracy. A debate shifted to make way for a reality TV show; a candidate who “rebrands” herself as her “real” self as a major campaign strategy; another candidate who has been roundly criticised for his extreme and anti-scientific statements; the almost complete absence of “minor” parties from the media; in addition to the usual vacuum of substance in discussions, debates, and the mainstream media.
While an international embarrassment for democracy, these developments do make the election itself easy.
Essentially, there is one question in this election with dwarfs all others. The approach to this question of both major parties is a scientific catastrophe. And the approach of the third party is not — at the very least, its concern for the question is encoded in its DNA.
First, it’s worth making clear that electoral politics is always insufficient. It is never enough to cast one’s vote and then switch off for the next 3 years. One should never put one’s faith in a representative beholden to party discipline, poll marginalism, and the democratic deficit of a faraway capital. But elections do have real effects, and in this election the effects are undoubtedly serious.
There is one question which dwarfs all others, because the future of the planet is in question, depending on actions taken in the term of the next government.
Yesterday, the Australian Academy of Science released a new climate change report. Once again, it reiterated and explained the scientific consensus that the earth is warming and that human greenhouse gas emissions are the main cause. Once again, it reiterated and explained the scientific consensus that if business continues as usual, global temperatures will increase significantly, and that this will have serious effects. And it went into some detail about what those effects might be.
This is not an ordinary peer-reviewed scientific paper. It is not just an opinion backed up by evidence and reviewed by experts. This is a synthesis of hundreds of academic papers. Like the international IPCC, it summarises the consensus of all of them. It is the sense of the entire community of experts. As such, it is inherently conservative. It is a minimal statement of what we are scientifically sure about; and it is extremely careful with questions we are not sure about.
This consensus includes: “business as usual” is expected to lead to lead to a warming of 4.5 degrees Celsius by 2100, possibly only 3 degrees, but possibly as high as 7 degrees.
This consensus continues: A warming of 4.5 degrees

would mean that the world would be hotter than at any time in the last few million years. Sea level would continue to rise for many centuries. The impacts of such changes are difficult to predict, but are likely to be severe for human populations and for the natural world. The further climate is pushed beyond the envelope of relative stability that has characterised the last several millennia, the greater becomes the risk of passing tipping points that will result in profound changes in climate, vegetation, ocean circulation and ice sheet stability.

In other words, the question is not marginal. That is how you say, in scientific language, that the fate of the planet is at stake.
Even a warming of 2 degrees Celsius

would lead to a significantly different world from the one we now inhabit. Likely consequences would include more heat waves, fewer cold spells, changes to rainfall patterns and a higher global average rainfall, higher plant productivity in some places but decreases in others, disturbances to marine and terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity, disruption to food production in some regions, rising sea levels, and decreases in Arctic ice cover. While aspects of these changes may be beneficial in some regions, the overall impacts are likely to be negative under the present structure of global society.

And, modelling emissions pathways, to have a “better than even” chance of preventing temperature rise of more than 2 degrees, global emissions “need to peak within 10 years and then decline rapidly”.
We are now about to elect a government for 3 of those 10 years.
To summarise: Australian society is about to elect a government for a time in which, in order to have a “better than even” chance of preventing a 2 degree temperature rise — which itself would still lead to a “significantly different” and more difficult world to live in — global emissions “need to peak within 10 years and then decline rapidly”. That requires a major structural shift in the global economy, starting immediately. Of course, that implies an immediate and major structural shift in the Australian economy too.
Three years ago, both Labor and Liberal parties were in favour of capping carbon emissions — that is, setting an upper limit on emissions, by law. A majority of the Australian public has consistently supported serious action on climate change regardless of international developments, despite disillusionment, the failure of the Copenhagen conference, and an upsurge in climate denialism. As the threat of climate change has worsened, and the state of scientific knowledge become even more disturbing, both major parties have responded by abandoning those policies.
The Labor party abandoned its policy of a cap-and-trade scheme after Tony Abbott became leader of the Liberal party. Abbott in 2009 described the scientific argument as “absolute crap”, and to this day disputes the scientific consensus — truly an heroic scientific dissent, since even his party colleagues describe him as “innumerate”.
Julia Gillard, Labor party leader, in her climate policy campaign speech, announced a new initiative: she would convoke a randomly-selected “Citizens’ Assembly” of 150 Australians, to examine the issue over 12 months, and wait for their opinion before taking any action. The policy has “become an ongoing joke in Labor ranks”. Needless to say, if emissions “need to peak within 10 years and then decline rapidly”, such a total abdication of policy is scarcely imaginable. The “policy” does not even appear on Labor’s policy website, such is the level of embarrassment. The independent Climate Institute estimates their policy will lead to no peak, no decline, but a 19% increase in emissions above 1990 levels by 2020.
On the other hand, the climate change policy of the Liberal/National party coalition, under Abbott, who describes the scientific argument as “absolute crap”, includes no limit on carbon emissions, and centres around an “emissions reduction fund”. Under this policy, their document proudly announces, “businesses will not be penalised for continuing to operate at ‘business as usual’ levels” — truly likely to lead to a major structural shift in the economy within a decade. The Climate Institute estimate for their policy is no peak, no decline, but an 8% increase in emissions above 1990 levels by 2020.
As far as I can find at the time of writing, neither major party has made any response to the Academy of Science report.
The Greens do have some commitments on the environment. In particular, their policy recognises “we have only 10-15 years to use our collective human intelligence to address the crisis of climate change and to prevent catstrophe.” They propose a cap on carbon, a 40% reduction on 1990 greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, and other serious action.
The only electoral outcome which can give a non-catastrophic, science-based Australian climate policy, in the period in which emissions “need to peak within 10 years and then decline rapidly”, is a large swing to the Greens.
In Australia, with mandatory and preferential voting, the electoral system makes this choice easier than elsewhere. In the US and elsewhere, With a first-past-the-post system, a vote for the Greens takes a vote away from other parties. With Australia’s preferential voting system, if the Greens do not get your highest first vote, then your vote switches to the lesser of the other evils, as you decide. You decide where your vote goes and in what order.
The Greens may well obtain the balance of power in the Senate, as well as a lower house seat here in Melbourne. An increased vote may give them real leverage to force climate action upon whatever government takes office.
Of course, a mere vote at this election is not enough. It will take serious, urgent, international and sustained action to make the changes necessary to maintain a liveable planet, as the science demands. This electoral campaign, if nothing else, should be an education to Australians about the bankruptcy of their political system, the oncoming crisis in the climate system, and the need for vast changes in their society.

The hyperbolic meaning of the Milnor–Wood inequality

(21 pages) – on the arXiv – published in Expositiones Mathematicae.

Abstract: We introduce a notion of the twist of an isometry of the hyperbolic plane. This twist function is defined on the universal covering group of orientation-preserving isometries of the hyperbolic plane, at each point in the plane. We relate this function to a function defined by Milnor and generalised by Wood. We deduce various properties of the twist function, and use it to give new proofs of several well-known results, including the Milnor–Wood inequality, using purely hyperbolic-geometric methods. Our methods express inequalities in Milnor’s function as equalities, with the deficiency from equality given by an area in the hyperbolic plane. We find that the twist of certain products found in surface group presentations is equal to the area of certain hyperbolic polygons arising as their fundamental domains.

on_milnor

Hyperbolic cone-manifold structures with prescribed holonomy II: higher genus

(25 pages) – on the arXiv – published in Geometriae Dedicata.

Abstract: We consider the relationship between hyperbolic cone-manifold structures on surfaces, and algebraic representations of the fundamental group into a group of isometries. A hyperbolic cone-manifold structure on a surface, with all interior cone angles being integer multiples of \(2\pi\), determines a holonomy representation of the fundamental group. We ask, conversely, when a representation of the fundamental group is the holonomy of a hyperbolic cone-manifold structure. In this paper we build upon previous work with punctured tori to prove results for higher genus surfaces. Our techniques construct fundamental domains for hyperbolic cone-manifold structures, from the geometry of a representation. Central to these techniques are the Euler class of a representation, the group \(\widetilde{PSL_2\mathbb{R}}\), the twist of hyperbolic isometries, and character varieties. We consider the action of the outer automorphism and related groups on the character variety, which is measure-preserving with respect to a natural measure derived from its symplectic structure, and ergodic in certain regions. Under various hypotheses, we almost surely or surely obtain a hyperbolic cone-manifold structure with prescribed holonomy.

hyp_cone_mfld_2

Hyperbolic cone-manifold structures with prescribed holonomy I: punctured tori

(40 pages) – on the arXiv – published in Geometriae Dedicata.

Abstract: We consider the relationship between hyperbolic cone-manifold structures on surfaces, and algebraic representations of the fundamental group into a group of isometries. A hyperbolic cone-manifold structure on a surface, with all interior cone angles being integer multiples of \(2\pi\), determines a holonomy representation of the fundamental group. We ask, conversely, when a representation of the fundamental group is the holonomy of a hyperbolic cone-manifold structure. In this paper we prove results for the punctured torus; in the sequel, for higher genus surfaces. We show that a representation of the fundamental group of a punctured torus is a holonomy representation of a hyperbolic cone-manifold structure with no interior cone points and a single corner point if and only if it is not virtually abelian. We construct a pentagonal fundamental domain for hyperbolic structures, from the geometry of a representation. Our techniques involve the universal covering group \(\widetilde{PSL_2\mathbb{R}}\) of the group of orientation-preserving isometries of \(\mathbb{H}^2\) and Markoff moves arising from the action of the mapping class group on the character variety.

hyp_cone_mfld_1